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I. INDEX OF ACRONYMS 
 
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
CSW: Commission on the Status of Women 
DEVAW: Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
GBV: Gender-based violence 
NGO: Non-governmental organization 
UN: United Nations 
VAW: Violence against women 
WHO: World Health Organization





This paper aims to analyze gender-based violence as discrimination against 
women as a violation of human rights under CEDAW. Case studies from CEDAW will 
be used to show how GBV (Gender-based violence) constitutes as a discrimination 
against women, as seen through violations of articles from the Convention by state actors.  
The five cases analyzed in this paper are: A. T. v. Hungary  (2005), Goekce v. Austria 
(2007), Yildirim v. Austria (2007), V. K. v. Bulgaria (2011), and González Carreño v. 
Spain (2014).   
 
It is important to have a brief historical context of CEDAW and the role of 
women’s rights in international law. Cases brought to the Committee overseeing 
CEDAW demonstrate the failed protection of women who have experienced violence. 
The five cases examined in this paper are cases where violence against women has 
occurred and state actors have failed to comply with their obligations as mandated by 
CEDAW. The case studies used in this paper also reflect the incorporation of General 
Recommendation No. 19 of the CEDAW Committee in the conclusions agreed upon by 
the committee in deciding these cases. These cases demonstrate how CEDAW as an 
international treaty can highlight the errors states have made in protecting women from 
violence. 
 
Ideas throughout the paper will demonstrate how violence against women is a 
discrimination that constitutes a violation of CEDAW, a violation within international 
human rights law. Themes throughout the paper that are of relevance include applying a 
gender perspective to human rights, due diligence and the obligation of States in 
international human rights law, the public/private dichotomy in human rights law, and 
general treatment of domestic violence and gender-based violence universally.
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III. SCOPE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & ANTECEDENTS TO 
CEDAW 




Source: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination 
on the Discrimination of Violence Against Women.
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2. Violence against women statistics 
 
 Violence against women is an epidemic that is experienced by women 
universally.  While statistics can be hard to gather due to under-reporting, given the 
stigma survivors of violence face, it is important to present a scope of the problem at 
hand.  The numbers are striking, and demonstrate a crucial need for the issue to be 
addressed in the area of international human rights law. 
 
 According to the United Nations, violence against women is defined as follows: 
“Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual 
or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."1  
• Global estimates published by WHO (World Health Organization) indicate that about 1 in 3 
(35%) women worldwide have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner 
violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime.2 
 
• Most of this violence is intimate partner violence. Worldwide, almost one third (30%) of 
women who have been in a relationship report that they have experienced some form of 
physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner in their lifetime.3 
 
• Globally, as many as 38% of murders of women are committed by a male intimate partner.4 
• Although little data is available—and great variation in how psychological violence is 
measured across countries and cultures—existing evidence shows high prevalence rates. 
Forty-three per cent of women in the 28 European Union Member States have experienced 
some form of psychological violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime.5  
• It is estimated that of all women who were the victims of homicide globally in 2012, almost 
half were killed by intimate partners or family members, compared to less than six per cent of 
men killed in the same year.6 
 
																																																								
1 World Health Organization Media Centre, Violence against women, Intimate partner and sexual violence 
against women Fact Sheet, (2016), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Violence against Women: An EU-wide survey, 






 Several instruments, treaties, declarations, and conferences were crucial in 
bringing international attention to violence against women and women’s human rights 
before the adoption of CEDAW1 and afterwards with the Committee and the Optional 
Protocol.  Bringing topics of women’s struggles, particularly gender-based violence, to 
the realm of international human rights law has been a slow process that is not yet 
complete.  The full realization of women’s human rights has not been accomplished in 
any country, but strides have been made with movements on the international human 
rights platform.  The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was an instrumental 
factor in what was to eventually become CEDAW and recognizing women’s human 
rights.  It is important to draw attention to other instruments such as DEVAW 
(Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women), the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, and the Beijing Platform for Action.  Recognizing where 
women’s human rights have stood throughout modern history is vital in understanding 
the role of CEDAW and how women can claim their human rights currently. 
 
 In 1947 the Commission on the Status of Women had its first meeting shortly 
after the founding of the United Nations.  Here, all fifteen government representatives 
were women.  The Commission was instrumental in its contributions to changing 
discriminatory language within treaties and conventions along with proposing legislation 
to focus on gender discrimination.  The reason “men” is not used to represent human 
beings in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is due to the work of the 
Commission.6 The first international tool that recognized the political rights of women 




6 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249. 
7 United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/RES/640(VII), Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, 20 December 1952. 
 8	
 With endorsement from the United Nations General Assembly, the first World 
Conference on Women was held in Mexico City in 1975, concerning efforts to promote 
women’s equality along with peace and development.  Conferences to follow were held 
in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995).  Notably, in between the 
Nairobi and Beijing conferences was the adoption of DEVAW (Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women) by the General Assembly, as a result of 
mainstreaming efforts to place violence against women on an international platform.  The 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for action in 1995 to date was considered the “most 
progressive blueprint” on women’s rights, with 189 participating governments.8  One of 
the twelve areas of concern in its objective of empowering women globally is violence 
against women.  Cited in the Declaration and Platform is the stress placed on 
governments to be concerned with the issue of violence against women:  
 
“Violence against women both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The long-standing failure to protect and promote those 
rights and freedoms in the case of violence against women is a matter of concern to all States and 
should be addressed.”9  
 
 While there are 5-year reviews on the progress of implementing the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for action, it is does not have the binding capability of an 
international human rights law treaty.  Activism and movements in placing women’s 
human rights at the center of discussion regarding international law have proven to be 
extremely important, as these tools and instruments have demonstrated.  However, states 
are held accountable by treaties they have signed and ratified, also by giving competence 
to the Committee to decide on violations of treaties such as CEDAW, where violence 





8 UN Women The Beijing Platform for Action: inspiration then and now (2005) available at 
http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/about.  
9 United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 




 4. VAW in International Human Rights Law 
A. Recognition of Violence Against Women in International Human Rights Law 
 
 In CEDAW, violence against women is nowhere to be found in the Convention 
itself.  The Convention concerns discrimination against women, but violence against 
women was not added in the original text.  There may be a reason for this, as CEDAW is 
one of the most-ratified human rights treaties of the UN, but with a very high number of 
reservations.10  Upon ratifying the Convention seventy-seven countries entered 
reservations initially.11 Why was violence against women left out of the definition of 
discrimination against women and left out of CEDAW’s original text? 
 
CEDAW entered into force as an international treaty in 1981 after 20 country 
ratifications, mentioning specifically in its introduction the importance of guaranteeing 
women social, economic, civil, political, and cultural rights.  Reproductive rights, 
trafficking and prostitution are mentioned, but not violence.  In her article “The 
Recognition of Violence against Women as a Violation of Human Rights in the United 
Nations System”, Shazia Qureshi explains:  
 
“It would have taken much more time and efforts to create a fresh instrument that would 
exclusively address the right of women to have a violence free life.  Instead the strategy to combat 
VAW by making it a part of obligations set out in the, already widely ratified, Women’s 
Convention, was seen more appropriate to avoid likely resistance from member states.”12  
 
Feminist and women’s rights movements have faced difficulty in all countries striving to 
recognize violence against women as a crime and support women victims while 
attempting to eradicate this form of violence within their own countries, and as is shown 
by the adoption of CEDAW with no mention of violence against women, the objective to 
recognize violence against women as a human rights violation was not reached at the 
																																																								
10 A list of countries that have ratified CEDAW as well as countries who have reservations on the treaty can 
be found on the United Nations Treaty Collection Website, Status as of 26 August 2017, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en 
11 L.M. Keller “The Impact of States’ Parties Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women”, Michigan State Law Review, Vol. 309 (2014), 309-326, p.311. 
12 S. Qureshi “The Recognition of Violence against Women as Violation of Human Rights in the United 
Nations System”, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), 187-198, p. 192. 
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time of adoption.  Due to oppressive patriarchal structures universally, it is plausible, 
while very far from ideal, that leaving out violence against women as discrimination 
enabled more countries to ratify CEDAW. 
 
The first instance where violence against women is recognized by the Committee 
is in General Recommendation No. 12 from the year 1989.  In this very short 
recommendation (one half of one page long) the Committee urges States to include data, 
legislation and measures adopted, along with support services for women in their periodic 
reports to the Committee.13  Generally speaking, General Recommendation No. 19 was 
much more significant, as it precisely names the relationship between gender-based 
violence and discrimination in its opening paragraph: “Gender-based violence is a form 
of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on 
a basis of equality with men.” 
 
The direct link between violence and discrimination was significant in granting a 
right to women to live a life free from violence, stipulated under international human 
rights law.  The expanded definition in General Recommendation No. 19 to include 
gender-based violence against women as a form of discrimination closed a gap that 
existed within CEDAW.14  The definition in the Recommendation “…identified the 
discriminatory pattern of VAW which constitutes a form of gender-based violence, 
thereby impairing women’s enjoyment of human rights.”15  
 
As shown by the adoption of General Recommendation No. 19, along with the 
other General Recommendations adopted by the Committee, CEDAW is a changing 
instrument.  Recommendations allow for additions and so-called “amendments” to be 
made to the Convention, making it adaptable to shifting notions on discrimination, but 
																																																								
13 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 12 
(1989) on Violence against women. 
14 Ibid. p. 188. Here, Qureshi cites this idea with R.McQuigg “The Responses of States to the Comments of 
CEDAW Committee on Domestic Violence” The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 11(4) 
(2007), 461-479. 
15 Ibid. p. 188. 
 11	
also to become more inclusive of women’s human rights.16  General Recommendation 
No. 19 demonstrated the absence of violence against women from the original 
Convention.  Rikki Holtmaat describes the “transformative approach” in how CEDAW 
can really be effective in eliminating violence against women in all of its forms.  He 
divides this objective into three sub aims: “To ensure full equality of women before the 
law; to improve the de facto position of women; and to modify fender-based 
stereotypes.”17 Ensuring equality but also encompassing improving the status of women 
and eradicating stereotypes are essential in eliminating violence against women, an 
objective now within CEDAW. 
 
Most recently, CEDAW has updated General Recommendation No. 19 with 
General Recommendation No. 35 in July of 2017.  The objective of this 
Recommendation is to provide additional guidance to State parties in eliminating 
violence against women.18  It includes further recommended actions for State parties to 
implement domestic legislation that promotes ending violence against women, reiterating 
gender stereotypes and oppressive structures that contribute to further discrimination 
against women.  Updates to the Convention like this Recommendation illustrate the 
transformative nature of the Convention, in clarifying its obligations for member States 
and measures to effectively eliminate gender-based violence.  These updates also 
demonstrate the desire to center around areas of women’s human rights that have not 




16 CEDAW Article 21 reads: “The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report 
annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and 
general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information received from the States 
Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be included in the report of the Committee 
together with comments, if any, from States Parties.” 
17 R. Holtmaat “The CEDAW: a holistic approach to women’s equality”, in A. Hellum, H. Sinding Aasen 
(eds.), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in international, regional, and national law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2013, 95-123, p. 95. 
18 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc C/GC/45, General 
Recommendation No. 35 (1992) on gender-based violence against women. 
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B. Applying gender perspective to international human rights law regarding violence 
against women 
 
 When analyzing the phenomenon of violence against women in all countries of 
the world, a gender perspective must be applied to the international law countries are 
bound to that is supposed to protect the rights of women and girls.  This international law 
also concerns discrimination against women, directly what CEDAW is supposed to 
protect once countries have ratified the treaty.  In our current society, international law 
and treaties protect human rights.  It is important to distinguish international law that 
comes from a gender perspective versus an international law that does not.  
 
 In her essay on gender perspective related to a human-rights based focus, Elena de 
Luis Romero describes characteristics that comprise a gender perspective in general, 
including most importantly a focus on power relations between men and women and 
women’s struggle to access resources men have always been able to access.  She notes 
that women’s exclusion is as important to mention as inequality.19  
 
Why is it important to apply gender perspective in human rights?  Based on the 
characteristics on gender perspective, it is obvious certain practices, laws, and stereotypes 
have created gender discrimination for women in relation to men being able to exercise 
their fundamental human rights.  It is advantageous to consider the history and social 
circumstances surrounding this gender discrimination in order to understand how to 
prevent it from occurring.  Romero also describes gender analysis as a powerful tool in 
combating inequality, referencing the concept based on Irene López’s understanding in 
her article “Integrando el análisis de género en el desarrollo”:  
 
“El análisis de género se consolida como una herramienta clave para describir situaciones de 
desigualdad entre hombres y mujeres y se utiliza para comprender las relaciones entre mujeres, 
hombres y niñas y niños.  Parte de la consideración de que hombres y mujeres participan de forma 
																																																								
19 E. De Luis Romero “La Perspectiva de Género y su Interrelación con el Enfoque Basado en Derechos 
Humanos” in E. Vargas Trujillo and H. Gambara D’Errico (eds.), Evaluación del Grado de Sensibilidad 
Frente al Enfoque de Derechos Humanos y la Perspectiva de Género, Los Libros de la Catarata, Madrid 
2012, 99-125, p.118. Regarding the characteristics that make up gender perspective, De Luis Romero cites: 
Grupo de trabajo sobre Igualdad de Género, del CAD. OCDE 1998. 
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diferente en los distintos ámbitos de la vida política, sociedad, y economía.  Este análisis permite 
identificar estructuras y procesos que pueden perpetuar los patrones de desigualdad.”20 
 
Based on this understanding, it is crucial that gender analysis and gender perspective are 
applied to human rights.  CEDAW is an example.  Why was a human rights convention 
created with its objective of ending discrimination against women?  It was necessary to 
apply a gender analysis to human rights, noting that women’s human rights differ than 
those of men.  Due to patriarchal society and other oppressive structures, men do not 
always share the violations of human rights that women have suffered.  Using a gender 
analysis as a tool to combat discrimination leads into investigation of women’s human 
rights as a separate and important issue. 
 
 If women’s human rights are to be a separate issue of importance, they must be 
recognized as such.  Originally, this was not the case in international human rights law.  
Susanne Zwingel explores the notion of using “gender blindness” that impacted original 
international human rights law: 
 
“The process of standard setting in international human rights unfolded simultaneously to the 
growing awareness of women’s concerns within the UN. While human rights law decrees a life in 
freedom and dignity for women to the same extent as men, the rights discourse within the UN 
remained "gender-blind" for a long time.”21 
 
It proved to be insufficient to have human rights treaties that focused on non-
discrimination solely.  It was important, as demonstrated by CEDAW, to create a treaty 
specifically targeting non-discrimination of women. 
 
In this paper, analyzing human rights from a gender perspective is necessary 
when discussing violence against women as gender discrimination.  Because domestic 
violence and gender-based violence affect women disproportionately more than men, 
implementing laws and implementing human rights treaties must come from a gender 
perspective.  It is an issue that requires understanding of history, social movements, 
																																																								
20 E. De Luis Romero, op. cit., p. 119.  
21 S. Zwingel, How do international women’s rights norms become effective in domestic contexts? An 
analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum 2005, p. 90. 
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current legal protection, and more.  We see in the country reports that are presented to 
CEDAW how states claim they are aiming to implement legislation that protects 
discrimination against women, improve education and training, along with other 
examples to demonstrate the meaning of gender analysis in attempting to achieve equality 
between women and men.  For example, in Austria’s Ninth Periodic Report of States 
Parties to the CEDAW Committee submitted in May of this year, 2017, we see examples 
of how using a gender perspective in attempts to change ideas on stereotypes and social 
norms that harm women: 
 
“Awareness-raising campaigns about all forms of violence against women and specific projects to 
support victims of violence were continued and expanded during the reporting period. A campaign 
about a life free of violence was carried out in 2014/2015 which included the following initiatives: 
(a) posters, flyers, videos and radio spots to make the helpline for women more widely known; (b) 
awareness-raising events for the general public about violence against women and support 
options; (c) support of third parties in implementing projects against violence — 136 partners 
serve as multipliers across Austria; (d) workshops and information material for five different 
target groups: health care managers, occupational groups involved in high-risk cases, migrants, 
adolescents and journalists. 
 
Gender aspects have been consistently incorporated into the National Strategy on Violence 
Prevention in Schools. Information and teaching material, workshops, dialogues and qualification 
initiatives for students and key multipliers in schools all address (sexual) violence against women 
and girls, honour crimes, stereotyped beauty ideals for girls, bullying in schools and anti-sexist 
boys work.”22 
 
In this example, two excerpts from the report were used to see how gender analysis is 
necessary when implementing recommendations from the CEDAW Committee 
responsible for the monitoring and cooperation in implementing women’s human rights.  
Here, violence against women is specifically mentioned in the public sector of Austrian 
society, and what steps the state is willing to take to diminish this practice, per their 
report.  Applying a gender analysis to the practice of implementing CEDAW internally is 
a concrete way states are able to contribute to the elimination of violence against women 




22 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/AUT/9, 
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention Ninth periodic 
report of States parties due in 2017: Austria,  15 May 2017, paras. 90, 94.  
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C. Special Rapporteur 
 
 The position of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women was created 
in 1994.  Within the United Nations system, Special Rapporteurs are Experts appointed to 
provide reports, conduct country visits, and in situations within countries of alleged 
human rights violations, communicate urgent appeals to the particular State.  It is 
possible for the Rapporteur to carry out visits with other experts, appointed rapporteurs, 
and working groups within the United Nations system. The mandate for the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women was established in Resolution 1994/45 from the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Special Rapporteur is another tool 
used in the realm of international human rights law, monitored by the United Nations.  
The Rapporteurs are appointed based on expertise in thematic areas.  Within the treaty 
body of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, there is a 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking 
in Persons.  
 
 The current Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women is Dubravka 
Šimonović, who was appointed in August of 2015.  She was formerly a member and 
chairperson of the CEDAW Committee.  Šimonović along with former Special 
Rapporteurs on Violence Against Women have been instrumental in reporting on 
violence against women universally.  With their expertise, these rapporteurs have also 
published articles that help scholars and lawyers tackle difficult situations concerning 
law, gender-based violence, and discrimination.23  The work method of the Rapporteur 
also includes working with civil society actors and NGOs to appropriately address all 
forms of violence against women within countries.24  The position can be viewed as a 
																																																								
23 See for example: D. Šimonović, “Global and Regional Standards on Violence Against Women: The 
Evolution and Synergy of the CEDAW and Istanbul Conventions”, Human Rights Quarterly, (2014), 590-
606. 
24 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 15 Years of the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences (2009), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/15YearReviewofVAWMandate.pdf.  
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preventative but also proactive tool on behalf of the United Nations system to tackle 
violence against women.   
 
 The Rapporteur has the ability make recommendations per the Mandate’s request 
to: “Recommend measures, ways and means at the local, national, regional and 
international levels to eliminate all forms of violence against women and its causes, and 
to remedy its consequences.”25  Along with recommendations from the Committee in 
individual cases, the Rapporteur as a tool allows for particular States to be held 
accountable for violations under the Convention and instances of violence against women 
that are incompatible with the Convention and human rights principles. 
 
IV. CASE STUDY: CEDAW 
1. Admissibility Procedure  
	
Familiarity with the admissibility procedure is central to understanding the cases 
analyzed in this paper that have been brought to CEDAW as well as other 
communications that are submitted to United Nations treaty bodies where citizens have 
felt their rights have been violated under a human rights convention.  The ability for 
individuals or groups of individuals to submit communications to CEDAW came with the 
adoption of the Optional Protocol in 1999, twenty years after the adoption of the 
Convention.  The Optional Protocol is a separate treaty that must be signed and ratified 
by States in order to give competence to the Committee that was established.  The 
Committee is comprised of 23 independent experts and meets three times per year to 
review the complaints submitted for violations under the Convention.   An individual or 
group of individuals who feels they have had their rights under the Convention violated 
by their State have a right to seek compensation, and an adequate remedy at the national 
level.  In the form of “views”, the Committee provides recommendations to the State 
party if it finds a violation, or several violations, of the Convention.  
 
																																																								
25 Ibid. p. 33. 
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 The admissibility procedure will be explained in order to understand the criteria 
that need to be met in order to submit a complaint to the CEDAW Committee.  The 
ability for citizens to present complaints to international human rights treaty bodies is 
significant, it shows how international law can be used by individuals to claim their 
respective rights under conventions their country has ratified.  These are the admissibility 
criteria for submitting a complaint to the CEDAW Committee, per the guidelines set by 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet:26  
 
1. In writing, the complaint must be submitted in one of the six official languages of 
the UN (English, French, Spanish, Chinese, Russian, or Arabic) 
2. The complaint cannot be submitted as anonymous. However, in the Committee’s 
final decision it may be requested that the individual’s information is kept 
concealed 
3. The intended State party of which the complaint is about must have ratified the 
Convention and the Optional Protocol 
4. In the submission, the individual or group of individuals must claim a violation of 
a right protected within the Convention 
5. The rights violated must be indicated in the complaint, along with additional 
documentation and pertinent facts for the submission 
6. The exhaustion of domestic remedies is essential before submitting the complaint. 
“The case must have been brought to the national court system’s last instance or 
otherwise evidence why national remedies are ineffective, unavailable or 
unreasonably prolonged needs to be provided” 
7. It must be indicated if the complaint has been submitted or is currently under 
review by any other international procedure  
If these criteria are met, the Committee will consider a case.  If the case is accepted and 
becomes registered with the Committee, the State party has a time frame of six months to 
respond with its views on admissibility and merits.  Once returned, the authors of the 
complaint may respond based on a time frame given by the Committee at the time of the 
submission, along with another chance for the State party to respond with any additional 
comments.  After this, the case may be considered inadmissible.  If the case is admitted, 
the Committee will continue to the merits stage and present its decision in the form of 
views and recommendations.  While it is impossible to enforce immediate and/or 
																																																								
26 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, How to submit individual 
complaints under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWIndex.aspx.  
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adequate action on the recommendations, the State party, if found to have violated the 
Convention, must respond to the Committee on any actions it has taken on the 
recommendations. 
  
The cases examined in this paper highlight that four States have violated the 
Convention by discriminating against women.  Given the admissibility procedure and the 
requirement of exhausting internal remedies, it is shown how four States’ remedies were 
not enough to protect women from violence and discrimination or prevent violence from 
occurring.  Submitting these complaints to an international human rights treaty body 
demonstrates failure of compliance by States in their obligations under the international 






















2. Five Cases Brought to CEDAW 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.   A. T. v. Hungary 
 
In the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’s 
decision in 2005 in the case of A.T. v. Hungary, we see a clear violation of human rights 
concerning violence against women, specifically, domestic violence. The case of A. T. v. 
Hungary demonstrates the first violation of CEDAW the Committee issued with regards 
to domestic violence.  In this case, Hungary violated Articles 2 (a, b, e), 5 (a), and 16.  
The Committee also mentions its General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against 
women in its consideration of the merits.   
 
This case will be referenced in several other decisions and views adopted by the 
Committee in violations of CEDAW where violence against women constituted a 
violation of rights. It is important to note that while 2005 may seem “late” for the first 
complaint on domestic violence to be reviewed by the Committee, the Optional Protocol 
of CEDAW did not enter into force until 1999, with ratifications coming in years after by 
member states of the Convention.  Hungary ratified CEDAW in 1980 and later the 
Optional Protocol in 2000. 
 
The complaint presented by the author of this case, Ms. A. T., in 2003, focuses on 
the State party’s failure to protect her from domestic violence, and actually perpetuating 
this violence by its inaction and discriminatory behavior.27  Because the author during 
this time found herself to be in imminent danger, she requested interim measures of 
protection on behalf of the Committee.  According to the Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee: 
 
“At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has 
been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State party concerned, for its urgent 
consideration, a request that it take such interim measures as the Committee considers necessary to 
avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violation.” 28 
																																																								
27 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/A/60/38 A. T. v. 
Hungary, views adopted on 26 January 2005, para. 3.1. 
28  Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc 





Even though the author requested an interim measure of protection because she 
felt threatened by her former partner, in this case referred to as L.F., Hungary failed to 
appropriately provide these measures as requested by the Committee in 2003, after the 
author first submitted the communication29.  Hungary as the state party at fault in this 
case, had the possibility to follow the communication by the Committee to provide 
immediate protection to the victim.  Instead, after several months and statements that the 
victim did not have proper legal representation, the Working Group on Communications 
noted that “…the State party had furnished little information on the interim measures take 
to avoid irreparable damage to the author”, including another request to Hungary to 
immediately place the victim and her children in a safe space. 
 
The request for interim protection measures on behalf of the author makes this 
case unique from the others studied in this paper.  The Committee has the capacity to 
issue requests to State parties to provide special protection measures, but beyond that, 
there is nothing it can do to enforce this request, it is a written or request via note verbale.  
This gives the State party somewhat of an opportunity, you could say, to redeem itself, in 
providing some form of protection that would benefit the victim.  Here, Ms. A.T. was not 
given protection or any form of justice or reparation during her years of suffering 
domestic violence, only to have this protection continue to be non-existent and not given 
by the State party after it was requested by a Committee overseeing CEDAW.  The 
Committee addresses this in its recommendations to the State party concerning the author 
of the communication firstly recommending that the State party: “Take immediate and 
effective measures to guarantee the physical and mental integrity of A.T. and her family; 
Ensure that A.T. is given a safe home in which to live with her children…”30 
 
To provide some background information on the case, the author, A.T., had been 
subjected to physical and verbal abuse by her partner, L.F.  The two shared a home with 
their two children, one of whom was brain-damaged.  A.T. was subject to battery and 
																																																								
29 Communication No. 2/2003 A. T. v. Hungary, para. 4.1. 
30 Communication No. 2/2003 A. T. v. Hungary, para. 9.6. 
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domestic violence, ending up in the hospital on several occasions to due injuries 
sustained by the violence inflicted upon her by L.F.  Even after L.F. had moved out of the 
apartment, he continued to attempt to break in and in one instance did break in violently 
to the apartment, inflicting threats and violence upon A.T.  A.T. claimed that there was 
no existing law in Hungary to apply for a restraining/protection order, and that she was 
unable to flee to a shelter due to the fact that the shelter would be unable to care for her 
child with brain damage.  As a consequence of the domestic violence A.T. suffered, 10 
medical certificates had been issued since 1998 after hospital visits the author 
experienced after injuries.31 
  
Analyzing the violation of Article 2 parts a, b, and e in this case, it is highlighted 
by the Committee that the State of Hungary placed a higher value on the rights of L.F. as 
a property owner over the rights of A.T. as a woman entitled to a safe life.  In the 
consideration of the merits the Committee writes: “Women’s human rights to life and to 
physical and mental integrity cannot be superseded by other rights, including the right to 
property and the right to privacy.32  This demonstrates a clear example of discrimination 
against women, violating Article 2 of the Convention.  Hungary did not “adopt 
appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, 
prohibiting all discrimination against women” per Article 2 (b) of the Convention. 
 
This case highlights Hungary’s lack of a law relating to domestic violence as well 
as restraining orders, which the Committee previously addressed in its comments to a 
State party report from 2002.  Comments on violence within the state included: “The 
Committee is concerned about the prevalence of violence against women and girls, 
including domestic violence.  It is particularly concerned that no specific legislation has 
been enacted to combat domestic violence and sexual harassment and that no protection 
or exclusion orders or shelters exist for the immediate protection of women victims of 
																																																								
31 Ibid. para. 2.3. 
32 Ibid. para. 9.3. 
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domestic violence.”33  The victim in her communication highlighted the lack of legal 
protection for women in Hungary, seeking legal protection from a former or current 
partner, or anyone inflicting violence or harm upon women. 
 
In A.T.’s claim, she is not only seeking justice for herself but also an intervention 
from the Committee into the situation of violence against women in Hungary.  This 
demonstrates how individual cases against states violating human rights treaties do 
matter, and can have an impact on a State party’s action or inaction regarding particular 
human rights.  Here, A.T.: 
 
“…calls for the (a) introduction of effective and immediate protection for victims of domestic 
violence into the legal system, (b) provision of training programmes on gender-sensitivity, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Optional 
Protocol, including for judges, prosecutors, police and practising lawyers, and (c) provision of free 
legal aid to victims of gender-based violence, including domestic violence.”34  
 
This call for action from the victim is reflected in the Committee’s recommendations to 
Hungary.  Hungary, in its submission on admissibility and merits, admits that “the system 
of remedies against domestic violence is incomplete in Hungarian law and that the 
effectiveness of existing procedures is not sufficient.”35 The Committee addresses this in 
its considerations stating: “The author could not have asked for a restraining or protection 
order since neither option currently exists in the State party.”  Later on in the 
recommendations, the Committee suggests an immediate implementation of such a law, 
along with the task of guaranteeing domestic violence victims “the maximum protection 
of the law by acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence against 
women.”36 
  
Analyzing this recommendation, it is clear the Committee is laying out States’ 
obligations regarding domestic violence and treatment of women by public authorities 
																																																								
33 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Supplement No. 38 UN 
Doc A/57/38, Exceptional Session 5-23August 2002, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5604264.html.  
34 Communication No. 2/2003 A. T. v. Hungary, para. 3.2. 
35 Ibid. para. 5.7. 
36 Ibid. para. 9.6. 
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and the law.  The first part of the recommendation insists the state: “Respect, protect, 
promote and fulfill women’s human rights, including their right to be free from all forms 
of domestic violence, including intimidation and threats of violence.”37  It is important 
that women’s human rights are specifically mentioned, as violence against women is an 
epidemic that entrenches every country in the world.  General Recommendation No. 19 
on violence against women states: “Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the 
enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general 
international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the 
meaning of article 1 of the Convention.”38  The State has an obligation to intervene, 
investigate, prevent, and protect women from this violence that disproportionately affects 
women compared to men.   
  
 Financial abuse is also a form of violence that women suffer at the hands of their 
partners and former partners.  As made evident in A.T.’s case, she suffered financial 
stress as a single parent living in a property she used to share with her former partner.  In 
the facts of the case, it is presented that the father of the children, L.F. was not paying 
child support for three years, causing A.T. to seek the support from police and the 
courts.39  One of A.T.’s two children is severely brain-damaged, impeding her from 
seeking a shelter because they were not appropriately fit to support the child.  The State 
did not enforce any action on behalf of public authorities or officials to enforce the child 
support payments the perpetrator had missed. 
  
When women are not financially independent, or cannot survive financially alone, 
they may be at higher risk to be caught in helpless situations, seeking help from public 
officials and/or the law.  Not only was A.T. suffering domestic violence, she also 
withstood three years without child support payment from the father.  According to 
Article 16 of the Convention, treating men and women as equals when it comes to the 
																																																								
37 Ibid. para. 9.6. 
38 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38, General 
Recommendation (1992) on violence against women, para. 7. 
39 Communication No. 2/2003 A. T. v. Hungary, para. 2.2. 
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rights and responsibilities during and after marriage and as parents is necessary.40  
Because public authorities handled A.T.’s claims in a discriminatory manner, Hungary 
violated Article 16 of the Convention.  The failure of L.F. to pay child support along with 
public authorities’ unwillingness to persecute this offense and aid A.T., lead to a 
violation, discriminating against her because she alone was unable to financially support 
her children, when it is equally the responsibility of both parents according to the 
Convention. 
 
As the first domestic violence case submitted and decided upon by the 
Committee, the case of A. T. v. Hungary resulted as highly important for future 
submissions to the Committee.  The case will be referenced in others examined in this 
paper.  The physical and emotional violence inflicted upon A. T., financial abuse, and the 
lack of a domestic violence law in Hungary make the case unique and important to study 
regarding women and their rights concerning domestic violence and international human 
rights. 
 
C. Goekce v. Austria  
 
 
In the cases of Goekce v. Austria as well as Yildirim v. Austria, both women victims 
of violence were killed by their husbands.  The communications of both cases came on 
the same date, with the views of the Committee adopted in Goekce v. Austria first.  What 
will make these cases different from the other three cases studied in this paper is the fact 
that the authors of these two cases with Austria are not the direct victims themselves.  
The deceased victims in these cases are represented by two Austrian organizations: The 
Vienna Intervention Centre against Domestic Violence and the Association for Women’s 
Access to Justice. 
																																																								
40 CEDAW Article 16 part (d) reads: “The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their 




On December 7, 2002, Şahide Goekce was fatally shot by her husband in their 
apartment in front of her two daughters.  The murder came after many incidents over the 
span of several years of violent abuse that Ms. Goekce faced at the hands of her husband, 
their children also many times witnesses to the violence that took place within the home.  
In this case, the descendants (the two daughters of Şahide Goekce) are represented by the 
Organizations submitting the case to the Committee to find violations by the State party 
of the Convention. 
 
According to Rule 68 in the Committee’s rules of procedure, of the Committee, a 
deceased victim could still be represented in order to submit a case to CEDAW: “In cases 
where the author can justify such action, communications may be submitted on behalf of 
an alleged victim without her consent.”41  The authors in this case refer to the 
Organizations representing the children of Şahide Goekce.  The authors state in the 
complaint of the case that no financial compensation or redress for the children is being 
sought in the aftermath of the decision.  Interestingly, it is acknowledged within the 
complaint section that: “The authors state that they have submitted the communication in 
order to call the State party to account for its omissions and negligence rather than to 
obtain compensation for the heirs.”42  The outcome of the Committee’s decision in its 
consideration and recommendations to the State party will not be able to provide 
protection or compensation for the victim, as she is deceased, differing from other cases 
analyzed in this paper.  Here, the authors are: “…seeking justice for Şahide Goekce and 
to improve the protection of women in Austria from domestic violence so that her death 
would not be in vain.”43 
 
In this case, three articles were violated, fewer than other cases discussed in this 
paper, but that does not mean the case is not “severe”.  While the case may seem more 
																																																								
41 Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/3/Rev.3, 28 May 2008, rule 68. 
42 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005, 
Goekce v. Austria, views adopted on 7 August 2007, para. 3.11. 
43 Ibid. para. 3.13 
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extreme because the victim, Şahide Goekce, was murdered by her husband, the 
recommendations from the Committee stem from how the State did or did not fulfill its 
obligations.  Austria ratified the Convention as well as the Optional Protocol in the years 
1982 and 2000 respectively. 
 
 Article 2 parts a, c, and f as well as Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 1 
are the Articles of the Convention violated by Austria in this case.  Article 2 describes the 
measures State parties should undertake to eliminate discrimination.44  This case in 
particular highlights a clear violation of Article 2 parts c and f.  The State party did not 
carry out the “effective protection of women” in its legislation and actions of public 
authorities.   
 
In its recommendations, the Committee first asserts that the State party: 
“Strengthen implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Protection against 
Violence within the Family and related criminal law, by acting with due diligence to 
prevent and respond to such violence against women and adequately providing for 
sanctions for the failure to do so.”45  The police themselves, along with ineffective 
communication between police and the public prosecutor, exemplify a failure to prevent 
and respond, or to produce an adequate response. Police knew from previous reports, 
including reports from the victim’s father and brother-in-law, that Şahide Goekce’s 
husband threatened to kill her and that he owned a handgun.  Analyzing these cases is not 
meant to go through all of the facts and see what adds up – in this case, the authors and 
the State party tell different versions of the story regarding how Şahide Goekce reacted 
when police arrived at her home and her “unwillingness” to prosecute her husband as a 
criminal (the reaction the State party claims came from the victim).  The job of the 
Committee is to review the facts as presented and decide if there is reason to hold that the 
																																																								
44 CEDAW Article 2 reads: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women…” Article 2(c) reads: “To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with 
men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective 
protection of women against any act of discrimination.” Article 2(f) reads: To take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices 
which constitute discrimination against women.” 
45 Communication No. 5/2005 Goekce v. Austria, para. 12.3. 
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State party has violated the rights of the victim under the Convention and if they have 
carried out their obligations as presented in the Convention. 
 
In Goekce v. Austria the right to life and physical and mental integrity is 
mentioned several times by the Committee.  Specifically in its considerations, the 
Committee affirms:  
 
“While noting that Mustafa Goekce was prosecuted to the full extent of the law for killing Şahide 
Goekce, the Committee still concludes that the State party violated its obligations under article 2 
(a) and (c) through (f), and article 3 of the Convention read in conjunction with article 1 of the 
Convention and general recommendation 19 of the Committee and the corresponding rights of the 
deceased Şahide Goekce to life and physical and mental integrity.”46 
 
The rights of the perpetrator cannot supersede the rights of the woman, specifically these 
rights to life and physical and mental integrity.  The Committee references its own views 
on this matter from the case of A. T. v. Hungary.   The case of A. T. v. Hungary was the 
first case concerning domestic violence that was submitted and decided upon by the 
Committee, as mentioned earlier in the study.  It is now used as a reference to reiterate 
the rights of the women cannot be superseded by the rights of the perpetrator.   
 
In the case of Goekce v. Austria it is interesting that the State party mentions how 
the right of perpetrator cannot be overlooked saying: “The State party asserts that, 
although the present case is an extremely tragic one, the fact that detention must be 
weighed against an alleged perpetrator’s right to personal freedom and a fair trial cannot 
be overlooked.”47  This is not in line with the Committee’s views, as seen above 
regarding their deliberations and reaffirms statements made in its decision in A. T. v. 
Hungary. 
 
 Regarding the State party’s obligation, this is the due diligence factor that is 
crucial in implementing CEDAW, in line with international human rights law.  In the 
facts presented by the State party, they place blame several times on the victim for not 
proceeding with prosecuting her husband after incidents of violence and restraining order 
																																																								
46 Ibid. para. 12.1.6. 
47 Ibid. para. 8.17. 
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that followed.  In reality, it is the State party’s obligation to protect against violence and 
prosecute perpetrators of violence.  According to the obligations laid out in General 
Recommendation No. 19: 
  
“Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence against women. It is prevalent in 
all societies. Within family relationships women of all ages are subjected to violence of all kinds, 
including battering, rape, other forms of sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which 
are perpetuated by traditional attitudes. Lack of economic independence forces many women to 
stay in violent relationships. The abrogation of their family responsibilities by men can be a form 
of violence, and coercion. These forms of violence put women’s health at risk and impair their 
ability to participate in family life and public life on a basis of equality.”48 
 
Living under threat and constant fear of violence is contrary to living out the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed in human rights conventions and national constitutions.  Women do 
not always have the free choice to leave their abusive partners.  Many women are fearful 
that leaving will cause more harm, including harm to their children, whom perpetrators of 
violence can use as leverage to maintain control. 
 
 There is an unequal power relation within couples where domestic violence is a 
factor.  In these situations where perpetrators of domestic violence are not punished, there 
exists a discrimination if the unprotected woman continues to be victimized at the hands 
of public authorities and officials who are able to protect the victim and prevent the 
violence, but instead due to inaction or inadequate action fail to stop the recurring crimes.  
In Article 3 of the Convention, it maintains that States must take the appropriate 
measures to guarantee women “the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”49  In this case, Şahide Goekce 
was evaluated by police without serious consideration of the threats she was facing, 
including the fact that her male partner who had abused her owned a gun illegally.50  
Here, Şahide Goekce was unable to exercise rights equally.  As mentioned above, the 
																																																								
48 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38, General 
Recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, Article 16. 
49 CEDAW Article 3 reads: “States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, 
economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to en sure the full 
development and advancement of women , for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” 
50 Communication 5/2005 Goekce v. Austria, para. 12.1.3. 
 30	
“perpetrator’s right to personal freedom” was valued over Şahide Goekce’s rights to life 
and physical and mental integrity, showcasing a violation of Article 3. 
 
Per General Recommendation No. 19, states can be held responsible for acts of 
individuals, including private acts.  It will be consequently analyzed in this paper how 
domestic violence had formerly existed in the “private” sphere, but that States need to 
intervene and protect victims, and punish criminals.  This case involves the murder of a 
woman and is a clear example of how the State can be held accountable for the actions of 
an individual actor, in the private or public sphere.  The Committee’s decision is based in 
part on the fact that the death of Şahide Goekce was preventable; that actions by law 
enforcement and public officials were insufficient or non-existent in protecting Ms. 
Goekce and preventing her death.  
 
D.   Yildirim v. Austria  
 
 
The Committee decided upon Yildirim v. Austria and Goekce v. Austria on the same 
date, August 6, 2007.  The same organizations representing the deceased victims in theses 
cases, Şahide Goekce and Fatma Yildirim, had relationships with the victims, as these 
women were clients of the organizations’ services.  The Vienna Intervention Centre 
against Domestic Violence and the Association for Women’s Access to justice are the 
authors of these cases who submitted the communications to the Committee in 2004.  The 
authors in both circumstances represent the deceased women along with their heirs, 
Şahide Goecke’s two children and Fatma Yildirim’s three children. 
 
In the case of Yildirim v. Austria, domestic violence occurred mostly in the form of 
threats.  The victim, Fatma Yildirm, had received countless death threats from her 
husband, including threats that took place at her workplace.  She was living under fear of 
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her husband, and did file for divorce, but was killed one month later.  She was fatally 
stabbed by her husband on her way home form work.51 
 
This is an example of how physical violence does not need to be inflicted in order to 
live under threat, to live a life where you are not able to exercise your rights to life and 
physical and mental integrity, as the authors argue on behalf of Ms. Fatma Yildirim.  The 
Committee, in its consideration of the merits, cites the failed obligation of the State 
regarding General Recommendation No. 19.  In its definition of gender-based violence, 
threats are included.  The Recommendation affirms:  
 
“The Convention in article 1 defines discrimination against women. The definition of discrimination 
includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a 
woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual 
harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based 
violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions 
expressly mention violence.”52 
 
The wording “threats of such acts” is important, and implies an included responsibility of 
member States to monitor these situations adequately, punish perpetrators and prevent 
said violent acts from being carried out. 
 
 An argument of the State party in its submission is identical to the argument made 
in Goekce v. Austria; Austria maintains that:  
 
“Irfan Yildirim had no criminal record, did not use a weapon and appeared quiet and cooperative 
to the police officers who intervened. Fatma Yildirim had no apparent injuries. On this basis, and taking 
into account that a suspect must be presumed innocent, the Public Prosecutor finally decided in the concrete 
case not to file a request to detain Irfan Yildirim because — from an ex ante point of view — this would 
not have been proportionate.”53  
 
																																																								
51 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 
Yildirim v. Austria, views adopted on 6 August 2007, para. 2.13. 
52 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38, General 
Recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, para. 6. 
53 Communication No. 6/2005 Yildirim v. Austria, para. 4.5. 
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Later on in the State’s review of admissibility and submission on the merits they go even 
further stating: “The State party maintains that, at that time an arrest warrant seemed 
disproportionately invasive since Irfan Yildirim had no criminal record and was socially 
integrated.”54  These statements provoke the Committee to make similar 
recommendations to those seen in the cases of Goekce v. Austria and A. T. v. Hungary. 
 
 Recommended by the Committee again, as similar to the case of Goekce v. 
Austria, is a reference to A. T. v. Hungary and the proportionality of rights.  The 
Committee asserts:  
 
“The Committee considers the failure to have detained Irfan Yildirim as having been in breach of 
the State party’s due diligence obligation to protect Fatma Yildirim. Although, the State party 
maintains that, at that time — an arrest warrant seemed disproportionately invasive, the 
Committee is of the view, as expressed in its views on another communication on domestic 
violence that the perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede women’s human rights to life and to 
physical and mental integrity.”55  
 
Again, with this reference that the Committee makes to the rights of the perpetrator being 
treated with a higher importance than the right to life of a woman, discrimination is 
clearly present.  This case includes a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, a guarantee 
of “exercise and enjoyment” of fundamental rights. These rights were not granted to 
Fatma Yildirim on “a basis of equality with men.” 56 
 
 Victim-blaming is present in the case.  Fatma Yildirim was blamed by the State 
party for not carrying out actions she could have taken.  In the State party’s 
supplementary observations, Austria claims Fatma Yildirim could have brought forward 
a complaint against the Public Prosecutor “had she [Fatma Yildirim] considered the 
official actions of the responsible Public Prosecutor to have been unlawful.”57  It is telling 
																																																								
54 Ibid. para. 12.1.5. 
55 Ibid, para. 12.1.5. The Committee in this paragraph refers to Communication No. 2/2003 A. T. v. 
Hungary, para. 9.3. 
 
56 CEDAW Article 3 reads: “States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, 
economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to en sure the full 
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” 
57 Communication No. 6/2005 Yildirim v. Austria para. 10.2. 
 33	
that the State party here is trying to place blame on the victim rather than acknowledge 
the missteps and inadequate response police and public authorities took when addressing 
the threats reported by Fatma Yildirim.  This is another area where discrimination is 
evident: a woman under threat for her life is still responsible for claiming further 
prosecution from men in positions of power and authority who would not assist her in the 
first place.  The State party’s comment above along with actions taken by the Austrian 
officials attempt to diminish the severity of Yildirim’s case.  Austria further claims in the 
submission that if the victim’s mental health was severely affected, she could have taken 
additional measures.58 
 
 In its decision, the Committee makes it clear that the victim took appropriate 
measures to protect herself stating: “Fatma Yildirim made positive and determined efforts 
to attempt to sever ties with her spouse and save her own life.”59  According to the 
Committee, the additional remedy that the State party suggested that the victim could 
have taken “would not be likely to bring effective relief”.  It is important that the 
Committee refutes the State party’s position by claiming its suggestions are inadequate 
and inappropriate, while instead supporting the actions that the victim took.  While the 
State party may guise the blame it places on the victim for not seeking alternative 
remedies for her situation as a way to make the case inadmissible by the Committee, it is 
clear this is yet another way they have chosen not to support the victim and not punish 
the perpetrator based on the dangerous situation Fatma Yildirim was in.  The Committee 
reaffirms this:  
 
“As to the State party’s contention that it would have been possible for Fatma Yildirim to bring a 
complaint under section 37 of the Public Prosecutor’s Act, the Committee considers that this 
remedy — designed to determine the lawfulness of official actions of the responsible Public 
Prosecutor — cannot be regarded as a remedy which is likely to bring effective relief to a woman 




58 Ibid. para. 10.3. 
59 Ibid. para. 12.1.3. 
60 Ibid. para. 11.4. 
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 Not only was Fatma Yildirim constantly threatened by her spouse, but her 
children had also been threatened.  Fatma Yildirim’s 26-year-old son was threatened by 
Irfan Yildirim, Fatma’s husband, and also reported the incident to police.  This occurred 
after several threats had previously been made against and reported to police by Fatma.  
Children are also victims in domestic violence cases, and experience trauma from threats 
and violence they may face directly or indirectly.  The authors express the interests of the 
children in seeking justice as heirs of their mother, in hopes that the Committee will find 
negligence and liability from the State party. 
 
 The Committee finds that the State party has not exercised its due diligence in the 
case of Fatma Yildirm.  This is a significant additional remark to make in the 
Committee’s decision, as it finds that Austria has violated several articles of the 
Convention, namely Article 2 parts (a) and (c-f), Article 3 in conjunction with Article 1, 
and General Recommendation No. 19.  The State not only has a responsibility to its 
citizens in preventing and punishing acts of violence, including domestic violence and 
threats in this particular case, but also to effectively implement the Convention in order to 
eliminate discrimination against women, which includes gender-based violence.  The 
Committee in its consideration of the merits asserts the following: 
  
“…In order for the individual woman victim of domestic violence to enjoy the practical realization 
of the principle of equality of men and women and of her human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the political will that is expressed in the aforementioned comprehensive system of Austria must be 
supported by State actors, who adhere to the State party’s due diligence obligations.”61 
 
As can be concluded from this comment and the Committee’s decision in this case, the 
State’s obligation to protect women from individual perpetrators of violence is crucial if 
the State is to follow the Convention and ensure equality between men and women.  
Whether in the private or public sphere, State authorities, officials, judicial members, and 





61 Ibid. para. 12.1.2. 
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E.   V. K. v. Bulgaria 
 
 
The case of V. K. v. Bulgaria is a technical case, with many facts presented by the 
victim and state party related to steps the victim took within the public judicial system 
after she experienced domestic violence at the hands of her former husband.  As the 
Committee states in their Consideration of the Merits:  
 
“The Committee reiterates that it is not in a position to review the assessment of facts and evidence by 
domestic courts and authorities, unless such assessment was in itself arbitrary or otherwise 
discriminatory. The decisive question is therefore whether or not the refusal of the Plovdiv courts to 
issue a permanent protection order against the author’s husband was arbitrary or otherwise 
discriminatory.”62 
 
In this case, the author, Ms. V. K. from Bulgaria, was not granted a permanent protection 
order from local or regional courts.  Rather, a short-term protection order was granted 
after complaints of domestic violence, but this did not ensure the life and health of V. K. 
were protected. 
  
What makes the case of V. K. v. Bulgaria different from the others studied in this 
paper is that the victim experienced violence outside of her home country as well as 
within it.  As stated in the facts of the case, V. K. moved to Poland with her husband 
(who is referred to as F. K. in the case) and two children for a job in Poland in 2006.  V. 
K. suffered physical, emotional, psychological, and economic abuse from her husband 
while living in Poland.  F. K. did not allow her to leave for Bulgaria with her two 
children.  She was granted some help in Poland by a Women’s Foundation, and 
dangerously returned to Bulgaria in 2007 with her two children.  After filing an 
application with the District Court in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, she was granted a temporary 
protection order and not permanent due to the fact that:  
 
“It [the District Court] applied article 10, paragraph 1 of the Law, which provides that a request 
for a protection order must be submitted within one month from the date on which the act of 
domestic violence occurred, and found that no domestic violence had been perpetrated against the 
author by her husband on 21 September 2007, nor at any other time during the relevant one-month 
																																																								
62 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 
V.K. v. Bulgaria, views adopted on 25 July 2011, para. 9.6. 
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period prior to her application for a protection order (27 August to 27 September 2007). It also 
found no immediate danger to the life and health of the author and her children.”63  
 
The “Law” referred to in the paragraph above is Bulgaria’s Law on Protection against 
Domestic Violence, adopted in 2005.  In its recommendations, the Committee commends 
the Law for the ability to issue immediate protection orders, but that in this case, all 
actors of the State, including the courts, must follow through adequately with what is 
required by Bulgaria in its obligations laid out by CEDAW “…to effectively protect the 
author against domestic violence.”64 
 
 It is important to note here that Bulgaria is the country of focus, not Poland, due 
to the fact that the State has an obligation to its citizens, even if they experience violence 
abroad.  V. K. continued to face domestic violence, along with other forms of abuse, 
upon her return to Bulgaria.   
  
A striking factor in this case is the existence of an exception for family members 
and domestic violence in Bulgaria’s Penal Code as noted in the complaint:  
 
“Domestic violence can only be prosecuted under general provisions on assault and battery or 
bodily harm (article 161 of the Penal Code). In addition, certain types of assault are exempted 
from ex officio prosecution if committed by a family member, although the State party prosecutes 
similar acts if committed by a non-family member.”65  
 
This is a blatant form of discrimination, knowing that women are more likely to be 
victims of domestic violence than men, experiencing violence from family members and 
their partners.  This sheds light on the fact that the “private” matter of domestic violence 
cannot remain private, States have an obligation to protect against all forms of violence 
against women.  In General Recommendation No. 19 of CEDAW this is explicitly stated: 
“States parties should take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of 
gender-based violence, whether by public or private act.”66  
 
																																																								
63 Ibid. para. 2.18. 
64 Ibid. para. 9.4. 
65 Ibid. para. 3.3. 
66 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38, General 
Recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, para. 24 (a). 
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The author also goes so far as to mention the Committee’s concluding 
observations on Bulgaria from 1998.  In these observations, the Committee expressed the 
need for the State to change its current view on and handling of violence against women, 
specifically “…to change prevailing attitudes to domestic violence, which view it as a 
private problem.”67  
  
In the complaints by the author (who is represented by counsel in the case) she 
specifically cites General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women 
reiterating: “…the Committee stated that gender-based violence that lessens or nullifies 
women’s enjoyment of human rights constitutes discrimination against women within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.”68  V. K., here as the victim and author in this 
case, has a clear understanding that her human rights have been violated based on gender 
discrimination.  For this reason, she is seeking recognition from the Committee that her 
claims are valid.   
 
While the Committee can only recommend actions to the State Party, the 
implication of violations in these cases is significant.  Showing State violations in cases 
like these may have several outcomes.  Protection and reparations are a key objective, 
however, the case can be referenced in future communications brought to the Committee 
concerning violence against women, more specifically, domestic violence, and condemn 
the State’s discriminatory practices.  This demonstrates the need for international law to 
be implemented internally, and how the international community will see human rights 
violations by State actors under specific treaties.  
  
 In this case, the Committee calls for interim measures of protection to be enacted 
by the State party in 2009, following the communication of the author in 2008.  This is to 
“…avoid irreparable damage to [the author and her two children] while their 
																																																								
67 Communication No. 20/2008 V. K. v. Bulgaria, para. 3.4. 
68 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38, General 
Recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, para. 7. 
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communication is under consideration by the committee.”69  Unlike the case of A. T. v. 
Hungary, the Committee in this case requests the interim measures of protection and not 
the author.  The Committee is able to do so via the first paragraph of Article 5 of the 
Optional Protocol and Rule 63 from the Committee’s rules of procedure. Article 5.1 of 
the Optional Protocol reads:  
 
“At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has 
been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent 
consideration a request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be necessary to 
avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violation.”70  
 
Bulgaria in this case did not respond to the first request from the Committee.  After the 
Committee’s second request, Bulgaria issued a response stating that the District and 
Regional Courts had “established beyond doubt that no act of domestic violence had been 
committed against the author.”71  The discrimination that Bulgaria is at fault for can be 
seen clearly in the phrase above cited in the case.  The State itself admits that its judicial 
systems had not found enough evidence of domestic violence to criminalize the act and 
the perpetrator, and was not willing to investigate further. 
  
An observation interesting to note is how the non-governmental sector played a 
role in assisting V. K. and her children.  In Poland, three months after filing for protection 
measures and financial assistance, a foundation in Warsaw called The Centre for 
Women’s Rights assisted the author.  In Warsaw, the Centre even filed a criminal 
complaint with the public prosecutor’s office for V. K.  NGOs assisted in bringing V. K. 
and her children back to Bulgaria: “The Foundation in Warsaw and the Bulgarian Gender 
Research Foundation in Sofia jointly supported her and her children by providing legal 
assistance and directing her to non-governmental organizations in Bulgaria providing 
support to battered women.”72  It is evident that the role NGOs and Foundations play are 
crucial for the safety and well-being of women and children affected by violence.  These 
																																																								
69 Communication No. 20/2008 V. K. v. Bulgaria, para. 5.1. 
70 United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/RES/54/4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 15 October 1999, Article 5.1.  
71 Communication No. 20/2008 V. K. v. Bulgaria, para. 4.8. 
72 Ibid. para. 2.14. 
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acts of assistance and protection could be carried out by the State.  In this case, where 
States failed to help and protect the victim in a timely or adequate manner, non-
governmental agencies and organizations played that role. 
 
 Simone Cusack and Lisa Pusey note the limited understanding for domestic 
violence in this case concerning Bulgaria.  The existing gender stereotypes in law and 
practice in Bulgaria as well as what can constitute gender-based violence are mentioned.  
Referencing the Committee’s recommendations they state:  
 
“In holding the state party accountable for refusing VK such an order, the Committee criticised its 
reliance on an overly restrictive understanding of domestic violence, its failure to take the 
complete history of violence into account and the excessively high standard of proof imposed on 
the victim/survivor. The Committee cautioned against such a restrictive understanding and 
clarified that gender-based violence must be understood to include actual and threatened physical 
and non-physical violence, coercion and other deprivations of liberty; a direct and immediate 
threat to life, health or physical integrity, it said, is not required. At the same time, the Committee 
clarified that it is inconsistent with CEDAW and current anti-discrimination standards to require 
an individual victim/survivor in civil proceedings to prove domestic violence beyond all 
reasonable doubt. The Committee was also highly critical of the lack of domestic violence shelters 
and the domestic courts’ reliance on gender stereotypes.”73  
 
The danger with a restrictive understanding of gender-based violence or domestic 
violence falls upon victims of these types of violence.  According to statistics gathered by 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2014, 23% of women between 
the ages of 18 and 74 in Bulgaria at least once in their lifetimes will experience intimate 
partner physical violence and/or sexual violence.74  If the State is unwilling to recognize a 
broader definition that is not entrenched in discriminatory notions, there exists a 
deprivation of liberty to victims of violence, most notably women who experience this 







73 S. Cusack and L. Pusey, “CEDAW And the Rights to Non-Discrimination and Equality”, Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 14 (2013), 54-92, p. 74-75. 
74 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Violence against Women: An EU-wide survey, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union (2014), p.158.  
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F.   González Carreño v. Spain 
 
Spain’s first violation of CEDAW came from the CEDAW Committee’s decision 
on July 16, 2014, two years after the initial submission of the communication by the 
author. Formerly, the committee due to rationae temporis considered a communication 
submitted in 2005 by Cristina Muñoz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña inadmissible; Spain had 
not yet ratified the convention at the time of the act of discrimination. The case focused 
on the right to inherit her father’s title of nobility for property.  
 
González Carreño v. Spain was a very important case regarding the violations of 
CEDAW and Spain as a member party.  Spain ratified the Convention in 1984 after 
signing in 1980 and ratified the Optional Protocol in 2001, two years after it entered into 
force. The decision for González Carreño v. Spain was adopted thirteen years after Spain 
ratified the Optional Protocol, a noticeable amount of time. We cannot speculate the 
amount of violations any state can produce due to individuals who may not always come 
forward with their case.  The Committee has focused on domestic violence as an area of 
concern in recommendations and adopted views in cases, and has noted domestic 
violence as an area where governments need to improve prevention and protection 
measures.75  
 
What makes the case of González Carreño v. Spain different than the other cases 
studied here is Angela González Carreño’s daughter Andrea, who was murdered by her 
father, referred to in the case as F.R.C.  This case is an example of violence against both 
women and girls.  In the facts presented by the author in the case, the author describes 
being subjected to physical and psychological violence by F.R.C.  Also presented in the 
facts of the case are notes from social workers describing the victim’s daughter, Andrea, 
																																																								
75 See, for example, General Recommendations 12 and 19 by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women that focus on violence against women and how states must fulfill their 
obligations under CEDAW by also being concerned with gender-based violence that includes domestic 
violence. General Recommendation 19 addresses domestic violence specifically. UN Doc A/47/38, General 
Recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, para. 24. 
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saying she wished to not to spend more time with her father more than the “required” 
existing regime of unsupervised visits.  As written in the facts: “During the months of 
unsupervised visits, social services issued several reports…there were probably 
objectionable situations consisting of repeated questions about the private and emotional 
life of the mother and confusing comments by the father to the girl.”76  The father would 
insist his daughter, Andrea, give information about her mother. He “…questioned the 
child about the author’s relationships, spoke ill of her, repeatedly called her a “whore” 
and accused her of having other relationships with men.”77 The facts presented in the case 
describe Andrea as developing anxiety and becoming afraid of her father, rejecting to 
spend time with him. 
 
 The Committee’s decision to invoke a violation of Article 16 (1,d) read in 
conjunction with Article 1 highlights the importance of Andrea as a child in this case.  
This Article and subsection reads: “The same rights and responsibilities as parents, 
irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount.”78  While CEDAW is not a treaty directed at 
protecting the rights of children, children are not to be discriminated against, and their 
best interest is to be kept in mind by the state party.  In this case, we see from the reports 
mentioned in the facts of the case by the author and late analyzed by the Committee 
demonstrate a failure by Spanish authorities to keep the interest of the child, Andrea, in 
mind regarding the supervised and unsupervised visits.   
 
 The violation of Article 2 parts (b) and (c) demonstrate Spain’s failure to provide 
appropriate reparations to González Carreño after the murder of her daughter.79  “Her 
																																																								
76 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 
González Carreño v. Spain, views adopted on 16 July 2014, para. 2.15. 
77 Ibid. para. 2.4. 
78 CEDAW Article 16 is referenced in this portion of this paper as reflecting the importance of the interests 
of the child. This is a different analysis from the analysis of Article 16 regarding the case of A. T. v. 
Hungary where the perpetrator of violence failed to pay child support along with the unwillingness of the 
state to prosecute this offense was discriminatory to the victim, A. T.  
79 CEDAW Article 2(b) reads: “To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions 
where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women.” Article 2(c) reads: “To establish legal 
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efforts to obtain redress have been futile” notes the Committee in its deliberations.80  Per 
these sections in Article 2 of the Convention, Spain failed to invoke sanctions and did not 
provide adequate legal protection and ensure equal treatment in national tribunals along 
with other public institutions.  Following the death of her daughter, González Carreño 
attempted several times to seek justice from public authorities.  In 2009 after she filed an 
appeal with the Supreme Court, it was later denied.  One year later her appeal in amparo 
before the Constitutional court was denied by the Court as lacking constitutional 
relevance.  It is clear that after the murder of her child, the authorities failed to give 
appropriate redress or reparation to González Carreño, also a victim of domestic violence 
that went unaddressed by Spanish public officials and authorities.   
 
Would the state have violated the rights of Andrea under the Convention of the 
Rights of the Child?  That connection will not be explored in this paper, as the focus is 
CEDAW and the case of González Carreño v. Spain.  However, the Committee in its 
decision specifically mentions how Andrea is a child and the state also failed to protect 
and prevent harm against her as it did to her mother, Angela.  “The relevant decisions do 
not disclose an interest by those authorities in evaluating all aspects of the benefits or 
harms to the child of the regime applied.”81 
 
It is extremely important to note the focus that the committee not only puts on the 
author, Angela, but also her daughter.  This case shows that “women” does not only 
encompass adults.  In this case, Spain failed to protect both Angela and her daughter 
Andrea.  Andrea ultimately died due the state’s failure to protect her.  Andrea, as the 
author’s daughter, has the best interest of the Committee in mind.  The victim bringing 
the complaint to CEDAW is Angela, the mother, but the daughter suffered as well and 
died in this case.  This highlights how discrimination against Andrea, along with her 
mother Angela, prevented the wellbeing and right to life of Andrea.    
 
																																																								
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national 
tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination.” 
80 Communication No. 47/2012 González Carreño v. Spain, para. 9.8. 
81 Ibid. para. 9.4. 
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 It is evident in this case how two victims of domestic violence, intimidation, and 
lack of protection suffered.  As a woman who lives in a state that has ratified CEDAW, 
the author was able to present her case on behalf of herself and her daughter.  Cases 
brought to the Committee come on behalf of individuals claiming their country has 
violated their human rights via discrimination against women.  But here, we see the 
importance of Angela as a victim herself also seeking justice that was not served to her 
daughter Andrea.  In the facts presented by the author, Andrea as a child suffered enough 
at the hands of her father, witnessing violence and abusive language toward her mother, 
as well as aggressive acts and abuse mentally and emotionally during her visits.  This 
affected Andrea’s health and stability.  As noted in the facts, the child witnessed several 
incidents of violence and harassment that involved both her and mother, an example 
being:  
“On one occasion, in 2000, he (F.R.C.) approached them at the entrance to the building where they lived, 
insulting the author and attempting to pull the girl away…upon reaching the police station [where author 
and daughter drove to and were followed by F.R.C.] in front of a police officer, continued to insult her, 
[author] threatening to kidnap the girl.  Seizing her by the hair while the author had Andrea in her arms, he 
tried to throw her to the ground.”82 
 
This horrifying incident, along with numerous others, would naturally cause a reaction in 
any child to not want to have any sort of interaction with the perpetrator, even if the 
perpetrator is a parent.  This incident in particular caused a “nervous outburst”83 in the 
daughter.  As victims of this psychological abuse, the author and her daughter have a 
right not only to be protected from this abuse, but also to live a dignified life where this 
abuse and violent behavior are not present.  Regarding equality and dignity of life, the 
Convention mentions in its introduction the UN Declaration of Human rights and 
“…affirms the principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth therein.”84  Here, Angela and her daughter Andrea 
were unable to exercise the freedom of living a life with dignity, living in fear and threat, 
																																																								
82 Ibid. para. 2.4. 
83 Ibid. para. 2.4. 
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Rights. United Nations General Assembly UN Doc 217 [III] A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 
December 1948, Article 7.  
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and facing opposition and no assistance from state authorities that are supposed to protect 
them.  
 
How does domestic violence in this case constitute a violation of CEDAW by the 
state party?  The recommendations by the committee are telling that Spain did not do 
enough to protect Angela González Carreño and her daughter Andrea.  In referencing its 
Communication No. 5/2005, Goekce v. Austria, the Committee explains in its 
deliberations that Spain failed to complete its obligation in treating the victim of domestic 
violence in this case with particular attention and non-discrimination to realize 
substantive equality, that the current model the state was using for domestic violence was 
broad and for a woman it was necessary to have the support of public officials (which in 
this case was not present, after the victim had presented many claims to authorities and 
courts).85  
 
Gender stereotyping is evident in this case, similar to the gender stereotyping in 
Goecke v. Austria and A. T. v. Hungary as described by Simone Cusack in her brief of the 
González Carreño case for the Spanish NGO Women’s Link Worldwide:  
 
“The Committee continues to recognise the linkages between stereotyping and domestic violence, 
through its ever-expanding jurisprudence. In A.T. v. Hungary, for example, the Committee noted 
that “traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men contribute to 
violence against them” and reiterated its concern that “entrenched stereotypes regarding the role 
and responsibilities of women and men in the family” are a root cause of domestic violence in 
Hungary.12 In a further example, in Şahide Goekce v. Austria, the Committee affirmed “that there 
are linkages between traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men and 
domestic violence.”86 
 
Anybody can suffer domestic violence act at the hands of a perpetrator, but in this case, 
due to gender stereotypes and antiquated views on gender (i.e. father’s rights and 
numerous claims and reports to police by the author that were dismissed or rejected based 
on the fact that domestic violence was historically viewed as a private matter not to be 
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86 S. Cusack, “Ángela González Carreño v. Spain CEDAW Communication No. 47/2012: Amicus Curiae 
Brief” Women’s Link Worldwide (2014) available at 
http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/files/gjo_amicus_brief_Simone_Cusack_angelagonzalez_en.pdf.  
 45	
interfered with) there was discrimination against the author and a violation by Spain of 
CEDAW in not complying with required actions as listed in the Convention.  
Specifically, the violation of Articles 1, 2 (a-f), 16 (1, d) read in conjunction with Article 
1, and General Recommendation No. 19. 
 
3. State Obligation 
A. Due Diligence Obligation 
 
 The obligation of due diligence placed on States is important in the international 
human rights law being studied in this paper on tackling violence against women 
specifically through CEDAW.  States have responsibilities when signing onto 
international treaties, most notably in international human rights law where individuals 
have the ability to denounce their states, contesting that their rights have been violated 
under certain treaties.  The five cases analyzed in this paper from CEDAW demonstrate 
State failure in its obligation of due diligence.  Why is the due diligence standard 
important in international human rights law regarding violence against women?  More 
specifically, in CEDAW, and how violence against women constitutes as a discrimination 
against women under this particular treaty. 
 
 Former Special Rapporteur Yakin Ertürk in her paper “Integration of the Human 
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women; The Due 
Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women” explains 
some historical context and why the due diligence obligation is important in various 
aspect of preventing and ending violence against women, to be used universally.  She 
affirms the importance of a human rights case ruled on by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in establishing high importance to due diligence:  
 
The standard of due diligence was taken up in the Inter-American human rights system in 1988 
with the landmark decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velásquez Rodríguez 
v. Honduras,87 which concerned the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez. The Court held that 
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Honduras had failed to fulfill its duties under article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights and concluded that, “An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the 
person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to 
respond to it as required by the Convention.”88  
 
Due diligence can often be found, as in this example, linked to prevention of human 
rights atrocities and violations.  Ertürk also argues this need for action in prevention 
regarding violence against women, citing the previous special rapporteur’s report from 
the year 2000 along with the good faith principle common in international law treaties 
such as the United Nations Charter.   
 
“Due diligence obligation must be implemented in good faith with a view to preventing and 
responding to violence against women. This will necessarily entail taking positive steps and 
measures by States in order to ensure that women’s human rights are protected, respected, 
promoted and fulfilled. In her 2000 report to the Commission, the former Special Rapporteur 
emphasized that due diligence is more than “the mere enactment of formal legal provisions” and 
that the State must act in good faith to “effectively prevent” violence against women.”89  
 
Prevention of violence should eventually lead to its elimination.  However, tackling the 
problem of prevention in gender-based violence has proven to be the most difficult, more 
difficult than prosecuting perpetrators and compensating victims afterwards.  The 
application of due diligence in this issue has yet to reach prevention effectively, 
according to Ertürk, who states:  
 
“The application of the due diligence standard, to date, has tended to be limited to responding to 
violence against women when it occurs and in this context it has concentrated on legislative 
reform, access to justice and the provision of services. There has been relatively little work done 
on the more general obligation of prevention, including the duty to transform patriarchal gender 
structures and values that perpetuate and entrench violence against women.”90  
 
As were examined in this paper, the four State parties in the CEDAW cases have failed in 
their due diligence obligations per their obligations laid out in the treaty.  Prevention 
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actions may have saved the lives of Şahide Goekce and Fatma Yildirim, the two Austrian 
women killed by their husbands in 2002 and 2003 respectively.  These two cases 
submitted to the Committee, found that Austria had violated CEDAW, after the authors 
of the case argued action on behalf of public authorities and officials could have 
prevented the murders of these women.  As explained by the authors in the case of 
Goekce v. Austria, their main objective is to the hold the State party accountable 
pronouncing: “If the State party protected women effectively, there would be no need to 
establish State liability… The authors state that they have submitted the communication 
in order to call the State party to account for its omissions and negligence.”91 
  
Regarding violence against women, due diligence extends the obligation of States 
to include non-state actors that are in most cases (in all of the cases studied in this 
particular paper) the perpetrators of this type of violence.  “Both customary and 
conventional international law establish that States have due diligence obligations for 
preventing, responding to, protecting against and providing remedies for acts of violence 
against women whether such acts are committed by State or non-State actors.” affirms 
Ertürk.92  Private acts are not to be treated differently than public acts if violence against 
women or other human rights violations are taking place.  General Recommendation No. 
19 of the CEDAW Committee clearly states this: “States may also be responsible for 
private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to 
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.”93  The 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women also explicitly mentions due 
diligence by States that include private acts in Article 4 of its text asserting States should: 
“Exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national 
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legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by 
the State or by private persons.”94  
 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) is a 
resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, one year after 
General Recommendation No. 19 from the CEDAW Committee was adopted.  The 
Resolution is often referenced as an important International Human Rights Law text 
applicable to UN member States.  It affirms that effective implementation of CEDAW 
can contribute to eliminating violence against women.  What is important in this 
Declaration is the clear use of the term “due diligence” and how it must be a part of State 
responsibility in eliminating violence against women effectively. 
 
Not exercising due diligence is part of the violations the State parties in these 
particular cases of violence against women have committed in discriminating against 
women.  The treaty is in itself an instrument to eliminate discrimination.  From structural 
types of oppressive discrimination in law, public authorities, and public systems, to 
gender stereotyping and direct discrimination from Police, courts, and other officials, 
discrimination occurs at many levels on behalf of States and affects women victims of 
violence.  Article 1 of the Convention that defines “discrimination against women” 
declares that women must be able to recognize and enjoy their fundamental freedoms and 
human rights on a basis equal to men.95  It is shown in the cases examined in this paper 
that women suffering violence, including domestic violence, are not able to fully exercise 
their freedoms and human rights.  If the State does not repair the situation, investigate, 
prosecute perpetrators, compensate victims, and prevent similar situations from 
happening, they are continuing discriminating practices that negatively affect women at 
alarming rates. 
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The responsibility of due diligence could be spread among non-state actors like 
organizations and institutions, argue Julie Goldscheid and Debra J. Leibowitz in their 
article “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils.”  In the 
case of V. K. v. Bulgaria, a Polish foundation for women’s rights granted refuge to the 
victim, Ms. V. K. for two months after she experience domestic violence at the hands of 
her husband, and later on with help from NGOs in Bulgaria V. K. was able to flee back to 
her home country with her children.  In the cases of Goekce v. Austria and Yildirim v. 
Austria, Austrian organizations and associations represented the deceased victims in 
these cases, as they had relationships of support with the victims while they were both 
alive.  Goldscheid and Leibowitz explain a model of effective responsiveness concerning 
due diligence and the State:  
 
“An appropriate model of state responsiveness should explicitly grant the  
State discretion not to respond, or to delegate its response to other stakeholders such as 
community members, survivors, NGOs, and advocates. It should consider the impact of any 
intervention on those at the margins— particularly those from racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual 
minorities— and should take into account the experiences and recommendations of both advocates 
and survivors.”96  
 
It is an interesting argument, as positive impact from NGOs has been demonstrated in 
protecting women victims of violence in countries all over the world.  However, the 
current model as set out by CEDAW and other international human rights instruments 
claim that State obligation in protecting human rights and preventing violations includes 
due diligence. 
 
B. Public/Private Divide 
 
 
 The public/private divide is an issue that has impacted international human rights 
law generally, not just women’s human rights.  In this paper, how the public/private 
debate impacts women’s human rights is of high importance, especially regarding 
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violence against women.  Many scholars have debated the public/private divide, and the 
role of the State in preventing or punishing human rights violations in either sphere. 
 
 The sphere that is of particular interest in analyzing how violence against women 
or gender-based violence is a form of discrimination against women is the private sphere.  
In the five cases studied in this paper, gender-based violence, chiefly domestic violence, 
was present in all five cases.  While there may have been isolated instances where acts of 
violence (including threats) were public, for example in the case of Yildirim v. Austria, 
Fatma Yildirim’s husband went to her work place and threatened to kill her97, most of the 
violence experienced by the women victims in these cases was private. 
 
 One of the objectives of CEDAW is to transcend the private sphere; its coverage 
is explained by Simone Cusack and Lisa Pusey:  
 
“CEDAW’s application to all fields of life — the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field — and discrimination by state and non-state actors allows it to transcend the 
public/private distinction, which has operated historically to women’s detriment. CEDAW 
expressly rejects the notion of impunity for violations of women’s rights that occur in the private 
sphere — including in the family — and/or are caused by non-state actors. The significance of this 
approach lies in its recognition that, unlike for men, many violations of women’s rights occur 
within the private sphere and failure to address such violations undermines the exercise and 
enjoyment by women of their human rights in all spheres of life.”98 
 
It is to be noted that the private sphere usually includes family members, and in all five of 
the cases analyzed in this paper all five women were subject to violence at the hands of 
their partners or former partners.  These cases are just five examples of the danger that 
women face privately, often in their own homes.  In adopting views on these cases, the 
Committee has made it clear that human rights violations take place in the private sphere, 




97 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 
Yildirim v. Austria, views adopted on 6 August 2007. para. 2.7.  
98 S. Cusack and L. Pusey, “CEDAW And the Rights to Non-Discrimination and Equality”, Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 14 (2013), 54-92, p. 62. 
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 The public sphere has been shown to be favorable to men, and the rights of men, 
but this domination extends to the private sphere as well.  Women in the private sphere 
have experienced and still experience oppression.99  The implication of this oppression is 
recognized in General Recommendation No. 19 of the CEDAW Committee, calling for 
States to act: “States parties should take appropriate and effective measures to overcome 
all forms of gender-based violence, whether by public or private act.”100  Hilary 
Charlesworth in “What are Women’s International Human Rights” affirms: “…If 
violence against women is understood, not just as aberrant behavior, but as part of the 
structure of the universal subordination of women, it can never be considered a purely 
"private" issue.”101  Patriarchal structures that remain in place universally extend to the 
private sphere, affecting gender stereotyping and typically assigned gender roles.  This 
contributes to the subordination of women economically and socially.  The ability for 
women to claim their rights, including rights to be free from violence, is also affected.  
 
 Civil and political rights are grouped into the “first” generation of international 
human rights law, where the context of the public/private split resulted from this set of 
rights.  Violence against women typically has not been appropriately supported by this set 
of rights or international human rights law.102  Therefore, the explicit inclusion of 
violence against women in General Recommendation No. 19 to CEDAW is important.  
This recommendation however is non-binding.  At the United Nations level currently, 
there is no binding instrument dedicated to violence against women.103 
 
The CEDAW Committee still references General Recommendation No. 19 in 
their decisions concerning domestic violence, firstly in A. T. v. Hungary.  This decision 
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will be important for cases submitted to CEDAW, as A. T. v. Hungary is cited heavily.104 
These decisions by the Committee demonstrate an international human rights organ 
transcending the private area, asserting State violations against individuals, even though 
independent actors committed the acts of violence.  State responsibility for the actions of 
individuals was previously discussed in the section in this paper regarding due diligence 
of the State party in international human rights law, namely CEDAW. 
 
States are no longer the only violators of human rights105, as is made clear in due 
diligence clauses in international human rights instruments, including CEDAW and its 
Recommendations.  This added responsibility of States can be useful in eliminating 
discrimination against women, as we see in cases surround domestic violence that usually 
occur privately.  The shift in how the public/private dichotomy is seen has changed the 
previous notion of the State’s role in protecting human rights in the public arena.106 
Charlesworth argues that the failure to sufficiently protect women from violence in 
international human rights law is the focus on the public sphere:  
 
“Although the empirical evidence of violence against women is overwhelming and undisputed, it 
has not been adequately reflected in the development of international law. The great level of 
documented violence against women around the world is unaddressed by the international legal 
notion of the right to life because that legal system is focused on "public" actions by the state.”107  
 
 
The public/private dichotomy is of special interest on the subject of violence 
against women.  The Secretary General of the United Nations’ 2006 report “Ending 
Violence Against Women” highlights the oppression of women specifically outside of the 
public realm:  
 
“The roots of violence against women lie in historically unequal power relations between men and 
women and pervasive discrimination against women in both the public and private spheres. 
																																																								
104 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/A/60/38 A. T. v. 
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106 I. Radacic, op. cit., p. 456. 
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Patriarchal disparities of power, discriminatory cultural norms and economic inequalities serve to 
deny women’s human rights and perpetuate violence. Violence against women is one of the key 
means through which male control over women’s agency and sexuality is maintained.”108  
 
Recognition at the United Nations level is important, as discrimination against women 
occurs both publicly and privately.  The citation above demonstrates an understanding of 
oppressive patriarchal structures and how they harm women universally.  It is relevant 
how viewing “discriminatory cultural norms” relates to how CEDAW works in 
preventing violence against women, as it is a Convention dedicated to eliminating 





 It is important to recognize the violation of human rights that occurs when 
violence against women takes place.  The five cases examined in this paper demonstrate 
how violence against women, while committed by non-state actors, constitutes 
discrimination in the way women are treated by the law and public authorities.  Current 
legislation, inadequate action, and failure to prevent violence by the State actors shown in 
the cases illustrate discrimination against women, contrary to the articles of CEDAW. 
 
 The Communications procedure has allowed for cases to be presented to the 
Committee that reveal a violation of human rights: discrimination against women.  
Violence against women falls under discrimination, as analyzed throughout the paper in 
the Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 as well as its decisions in the five 
cases. 
 
 It was crucial that CEDAW was created to solely focus on protecting the human 
rights of women.  The movement to recognize the human rights of women on an 
international scale may not be over, but great strides are being made.  This includes 
acknowledging that women’s human rights include the right to live a life free of gender-
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based violence, an issue that has plagued the lives of women universally.  Addressing this 
issue as discrimination at the level of protection of the United Nations is very significant, 
as CEDAW and the Committee’s Recommendations have aimed to do. 
 
A significant factor explored in this paper was the role of the State in this 
discrimination.  States are held accountable to human rights treaties.  It was shown that 
States’ due diligence includes protecting women in both the public and private spheres of 
life, with accountability for the actions of non-state actors.  States can play proactive and 
preventative roles in protecting women from violence. Because of existing patriarchal 
systems and gender stereotypes in governments, public systems, public officials, and 
legislation, CEDAW has been difficult to implement, most specifically regarding 
violence against women. The highest number of cases decided upon by the Committee 
have concerned gender-based violence. States must demonstrate how they are tackling 
violence against women and following the Convention in follow-up reports to the cases 
as well as the periodic reports required by Member States. 
 
The cases mentioned in this paper highlight clear discrimination against women 
by countries.  The cases put an international spotlight on violations committed by 
member states, available online from the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights.  The recommendations from the Committee highlight a 
demand from the realm of International Human Rights Law.  The aim is projecting an 
international standard on how to eliminate discrimination against women, a definition of 
discrimination that includes violence against women. Heisoo Shin describes this well in 
her article “CEDAW and Violence Against Women: Providing the ‘Missing Link’”:  
 
“…Violence against women impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Speaking in traditional human rights terms, these rights and freedoms 
include the right to life; the right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment; the right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in times of 
armed conflict; the right to liberty and security of person; the right to equal protection under the 
law; the right to equality in the family; the right to the highest standard attainable of physical and 
mental health; and the right to just and favorable conditions of work. This, within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the Convention, gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the 
 55	
Convention, whether or not those provisions explicitly mention violence. Violence against women 
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